Lab incidents divide scientists on research
Some warn of unleashing a pandemic
A series of biosafety breaches in federal labs working with highly pathogenic agents has created a rift in the research community, with some calling for a moratorium until safety can be assured and other scientists arguing that this important work should continue with appropriate precautions to prepare for pandemics and bioterror attacks.
"There is no doubt that the episodes of laboratory safety that have been in the news recently have reignited the scientific discussion about whether this type of research should take place, whether specific projects ought to be reviewed, and -- if the research takes place — should it be restricted to only certain investigators in certain institutions. I think it is a valid debate," says William Schaffner, MD, chairman of the Department of Preventive Medicine at Vanderbilt University Hospital in Nashville.
Distinguished scientists and researchers are divided on the issue, as evidenced by the signatures on position states by the opposing groups, one calling itself the Cambridge Group and the other Scientists for Science.
Difficult or impossible to control’
The Cambridge Group said the recent series of laboratory breaches with potential pandemic agents indicates an urgent need for a thorough reassessment of biosafety. "Laboratory creation of highly transmissible, novel strains of dangerous viruses, especially but not limited to influenza, poses substantially increased risks," the group said in a position statement.
"An accidental infection in such a setting could trigger outbreaks that would be difficult or impossible to control. Historically, new strains of influenza, once they establish transmission in the human population, have infected a quarter or more of the world’s population within two years."
For any experiment, the expected net benefits should outweigh the risks, the group argued.
"Experiments involving the creation of potential pandemic pathogens should be curtailed until there has been a quantitative, objective and credible assessment of the risks, potential benefits, and opportunities for risk mitigation, as well as comparison against safer experimental approaches," the Cambridge group recommended.
Scientists for Science issued a countering statement expressing confidence that biomedical research on potentially dangerous pathogens can be performed safely and is essential for a full understanding of microbial disease pathogenesis, prevention and treatment.
"The results of such research are often unanticipated and accrue over time; therefore, risk-benefit analyses are difficult to assess accurately," the pro-research group said. "If we expect to continue to improve our understanding of how microorganisms cause disease we cannot avoid working with potentially dangerous pathogens."
BSL-3, BSL-4 labs mitigate risks
In recognition of this need, significant resources have been invested globally to build and operate BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities, and to mitigate risk in a variety of ways, involving regulatory requirements, facility engineering and training.
"Ensuring that these facilities operate safely and are staffed effectively so that risk is minimized is our most important line of defense, as opposed to limiting the types of experiments that are done," Scientists for Science stated.
The most controversial aspect of this issue is so-called "dual use" research, which is defined by the National Institutes of Healh as "as life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security. "
The federal government’s oversight of dual use research is aimed at preserving the benefits of life sciences research while minimizing the risk of misuse of the knowledge, information, products, or technologies provided by such research, the NIH states.
There have been suggestions that the two research groups hold a meeting called by an impartial and respected scientific body.
There are preliminary indications that the debate may be bound for some type of meeting overseen by a neutral third party like the American Society for Microbiology or the National Academy of Sciences.
